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We study the pattern of volatility of gross issuance in international capital markets since 1980. We
find several short-lived episodes of high volatility. Over the long run, however, volatility has declined,
suggesting that international financial integration has not made financial markets more erratic. We
use VAR analysis to examine the determinants of the time-varying pattern of volatility, focusing in
particular on the role of financial centers. Our results suggest that a significant portion of the decline
in volatility of issuance in international capital markets can be explained by the reduction in the volatility
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There is a vast literature in international finance arguing that the increase in financial 
globalization over the last 30 years has made capital markets more erratic. This literature has 
highlighted how sequences of booms and busts in capital flows and in asset prices have become 
the norm rather than the exception, often wreaking havoc upon the economies of the affected 
countries. As a result, many economists in academia and in policy institutions have argued in 
favor of the imposition of controls on the capital account to reduce the volatility of capital flows 
and limit the impact that financial turmoil has on real economic activity.
1 
In this paper, we examine further whether, in fact, international capital markets have 
become more erratic. Contrary to most of the studies in this area, we do not focus on net 
international capital flows, but on gross issuance. We do so to better capture the ability of 
countries to gain access to international capital markets.
2  Moreover, whereas most of the 
literature has focused on the analysis of volatility in the access to international markets by 
emerging economies and the public sector, in this paper we analyze emerging- and mature-
economy issuance as well as private and public issuance. Also contrary to most of the literature, 
we do not restrict ourselves to the bond market, but describe the behavior of issuance in the three 
main international financial markets: The international bond, equity, and syndicated-loan market. 
The focus of this paper is the behavior of volatility of gross issuance in international 
financial markets over the last three decades. We show that, although international issuance has 
experienced several episodes of booms and busts, over the last thirty years there has been a 
substantial reduction in the degree of market volatility.  Markets are more stable now than they 
were at the beginning of the 1980s, thus providing a rationale for the elimination of controls on 
capital flows. 
Our paper also relates to a strand of literature in international finance that emphasizes the 
role of financial centers and their monetary and economic policies in affecting capital flows and 
price movements in the periphery (see, for example, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993)). 
Using VAR analysis, we show that the time-varying volatility of issuance in international 
financial markets can be explained in part by the behavior of macroeconomic and financial 
fundamentals in the United States. We find that, overall, economic and financial fundamentals in 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) and Stiglitz 1999. 
2 The evidence provided by net capital inflows presents an incomplete picture of financial integration. For instance, 
although zero net capital inflows may reflect no international financial integration, they may also reflect complete 
integration with international diversification, where inflows are just offset by outflows.   2
the United States explain about 25 percent of the movements in volatility of issuance around the 
world, whereas volatility of U.S. interest rates alone explains, on average, about 10 percent of 
volatility of issuance. Since the volatility of U.S. interest rates has diminished substantially over 
the last thirty years, our results suggest that such reduction in interest rate volatility can explain 
part of the reduction of volatility of issuance in international markets.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the dataset. Section 2 
analyzes the pattern of volatility of issuance across countries. Section 3 presents the results of the 
VAR analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1 The Data 
 
This section discusses the data sources for bond, equity, and syndicated-loan issuance in 
international markets as well as the construction of the volatility of the issuance series used in 




We use data gathered by Dealogic, a data analysis firm that produces two datasets on 
financial asset issuance: Bondware, containing information on issuance in the international bond 
and equity markets; and Loanware, containing information on the syndicated-loan market.
3   
Both databases start in 1980, although coverage of equity in Bondware only starts in 1983. Both 
datasets cover issuance by over 110 countries. For the bond and the syndicated-loan markets, the 
databases include borrowing by both the private sector and the government. 
Bondware contains information on issuance of bonds and equity, both in the international 
and in the domestic markets. In the paper we restrict our analysis to issuance in international 
markets. Following the BIS classification, for the bond market, our definition of international 
issuance comprises all foreign currency issues by residents and non-residents in a given country 
and all domestic currency issues launched in the domestic market by non-residents. In addition, 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed description of the Bondware and Loanware datasets, see Cipriani and Kaminsky (2006).   3
domestic currency issues launched in the domestic market by residents are also considered 
international issues if they are specifically targeted at non-resident investors.
4 
The equity portion of Bondware covers several types of placements: Issuance of common 
or preferred equity in the international market, issuance targeted at a particular foreign market, 
registered stocks traded in foreign exchanges as domestic instruments (for example, American 
depositary receipts (ADRs)), and issuance by residents in the domestic markets. Since in this 
paper we focus only on international issuance, we only include the first three types of offerings. 
The Loanware dataset contains information on syndicated loans, issued both in the 
international and in the domestic market since the 1980s.  Syndicated loans are credits granted by 
a group of banks to a borrower.  In a syndicated loan, two or more banks jointly agree to make a 
loan to a borrower.  Although there is a single contract, every syndicate member has a separate 
claim on the debtor.  All participating banks have earnings based on a spread over a floating rate 
benchmark (typically Libor).  Some of the banks also have earnings related to various types of 
fees.
5  As for the case of bonds and equities, in our analysis we are only interested in syndicated 
loans issued in the international market.  According to the BIS classification, international loans 
include all syndicated loans where the nationality of at least one of the syndicate banks is 
different from that of the borrower. 
 
1.2 Measuring Volatility in International Capital Markets 
 
The focus of our paper is the role of the financial center in determining the pattern of 
volatility in international capital markets. Thus, we are interested in the relationship between the 
center and the periphery. For the purpose of our analysis, we consider the United States as the 
main financial center. The periphery consists of eight groups of countries: The emerging 
periphery, including four regional groups of countries (Asia, Latin America, Middle East and 
                                                 
4 This definition covers Euro-market offerings (i.e., bonds issued and sold outside the country of the currency in 
which they are denominated, like dollar-denominated bonds issued in Europe or Asia), global bonds (i.e., single 
offerings structured to allow simultaneous placements in major markets: Europe, U.S., and Asia), and foreign 
offerings (i.e., bonds issued by firms and governments outside the issuer’s country, usually denominated in the 
currency of the country in which they are issued. Foreign bonds include Samurai and Yankee bonds. 
5 The description of syndicated loans is based on Gadanecz 2004.   4
Africa, and Transition Economies); and the mature periphery, consisting of three countries and 
one group of countries (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Other Mature Economies
6).  
In order to build our volatility series, we aggregate the individual issuance data in 
quarterly issuance by the financial center (the United States) and by each of the eight 
groups/countries in the periphery.
7   For each country or group, we construct three volatility 
measures, one for each financial instrument (bonds, equities, and syndicated loans). Volatility in 
each market
8 is measured as the annualized
9 standard deviation of the quarterly growth rate of 
international issuance. The standard deviation is computed over a moving window of four 
quarters.  
 
2 Volatility of Issuance: Short- and Long-Run Patterns 
 
Figure 1 reports the behavior of our measure of financial volatility of total world issuance 
in the bond, equity, and syndicated-loan markets. As the existing literature on international 
capital flows has highlighted, there are several short lived episodes of market turmoil. Some of 
these episodes of market turbulence are clearly related to currency crises in emerging economies. 
For example, volatility of issuance in the bond and the syndicated-loan market increases sharply 
during the Asian and Russian crises.  Sharp increases in world volatility are also linked to 
heightened volatility in mature economies. For instance, the increase in volatility in the 
syndicated-loan market in the late 1980s (shown in more detail in Figure 2) is linked to the 
shocks that followed the German reunification in 1989 and the burst of the Japanese bubble in 
the late 1980s. 
Figure 1, however, also shows that over the long run, there has been a marked reduction 
in volatility in the three financial markets that we examine. The first column of Table 2 shows 
the average levels of volatility in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s in the three markets. Over this 
                                                 
6 This last group includes all OECD countries with the exception of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  Table 1 shows the countries included in each of the five regional groups. 
7 To filter out seasonal fluctuations, we take four-quarter moving averages of issuance. 
8 In the remainder of the paper, we will use the words “instrument” and “market” interchangeably. 
9 As is standard in the finance literature, the annualized quarterly variance is the variance that would be measured 
over a year if the quarterly returns were iid; that is, the annualized quarterly variance equals the raw quarterly 
variance multiplied by four. The annualized standard deviation is its square root.   5
period, volatility declined from 16 to 8 percent in the bond market, from 58 to 23 percent in the 
equity market and from 15 to 7 percent in the syndicated-loan market. This suggests that, over 
the long run, markets have become less, not more erratic. Such decline in issuance volatility 
since the 1980s is similar to that observed in many macroeconomic real variables, the so-called 
Great Moderation.
10  Note that the behavior of issuance volatility contrasts with that of financial 
price volatility. While U.S. interest rate volatility has declined substantially since the 1980s 
(from an average of 2 percent in the 1980s to an average of 0.05 percent in the 2000s), exchange 
rate volatility and stock market volatility have mostly remained unchanged.
11  
In order to examine in more detail the causes of the time-varying pattern of issuance 
volatility around the world, Figures 2 and 3 show issuance volatility by mature and emerging 
economies separately, whereas Table 2 summarizes the evidence in these figures by showing the 
average levels of volatility in the three markets in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 
As shown in Figure 2, volatility of issuance by mature economies in the three markets 
declines almost continuously for all countries and regions, with the exception of Japanese bond 
issuance and U.S. equity issuance. Overall, volatility of issuance in the three markets halves from 
the 1980s to the 2000s.  Nevertheless, we observe episodes of high financial turmoil. For 
example, volatility of German equity issuance increases four-fold around the time of the German 
reunification. The combination of an expansionary fiscal policy and a tight monetary policy in 
Germany around the early 1990s
12 dramatically affected German equity issuance, with issuance 
collapsing from 1.8 billion dollars in 1988 to 400 million dollars in 1989. Equity issuance 
remained low (on average 700 million dollars per year) until after the 1992-1993 ERM crises. By 
1994, issuance had rebounded to about 4.5 billion dollars. Interestingly, turbulences in German 
equity-market issuance did not affect issuance by other European countries. Similarly, volatility 
of European issuance did not increase dramatically during the crises of 1992-1993.  
An episode of  extreme volatility of issuance in the syndicated-loan market occurred 
during the height of the bubble in Japan.  International loan issuance by Japan increased from an 
                                                 
10 See for instance, Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and G. Perez-Quiros (2000). 
11 For an analysis of the relationship between asset price volatility and real economy volatility, see the remarks by 
Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. to the Banco de Mexico International Conference, 
Mexico City, Mexico. Note, however, that a decline in volatility has been observed in investors’ forecasts, which 
should be one of the determinants of asset price volatility (see Campbell, 2005). 
12 See Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998) for an analysis of fiscal and monetary policies in Germany following the 
reunification.   6
average of 700 million dollars in the mid-1980s to 4 billion dollars in 1989, to then fall to 2 
billion dollars in 2000, and to finally collapse to 200 million dollars in 2001.  As in the case of 
Germany, this episode of volatility did not spill over to other countries. 
Finally, let us note that volatility of United States issuance in international bond markets 
sharply increased during the 1981-82 recession.  On average, volatility during 1981-1982 is 
twice as high as volatility in the mid-1980s.  
Figure 3 reports volatility of emerging-economy issuance. As in the case of mature 
economies, volatility of issuance shows a downward trend. Such a decline in volatility, however, 
is less pronounced than that of mature economies. As observed in mature economies, there are 
short-lived episodes of high volatility, mostly linked to currency and banking crises in the 
various regions. For example, between 1996 and 1998, volatility of Asian issuance increased 
from 22 to 44 percent in the bond market, from 26 to 35 percent in the equity market, and from 5 
to 25 percent in the syndicated-loan market. During this episode, Asian international issuance 
declined 65 percent on average in the bond, equity, and syndicated-loan markets. Volatility in 
emerging economies is also related to terms of trade shocks; for example, bond issuance in the 
Middle East collapsed during the sharp decline in oil prices in 1986 and volatility in the bond 
market increased from 52 percent in 1985 to 142 percent in 1986. 
Table 3 complements the findings in Figures 2 and 3. In this table, we formally test for 
the presence of clusters of volatility over time. We estimate a GARCH(1,1) model for each of the 
issuance series and test the restriction that the GARCH and ARCH coefficients are equal to zero 
using a Maximum Likelihood test.
13 As shown in Table 3, we reject the null hypothesis of no 
heteroscedasticity at all conventional significance levels for all the series with the exception of 
those of the bond market in Japan and the Middle East. 
Finally, it is important to remark that volatility is significantly higher in the equity than in 
the bond and syndicated-loan markets. Over the whole sample, total annualized volatility is on 
average 12 percent in both the bond and syndicated-loan markets and 33 percent in the equity 
market (see Table 2).
14 This observation also holds true if we look at each region and country 
                                                 
13 Autoregressive volatility models, like the ARCH and GARCH models, were first introduced by Engle 1982 and 
Bollerslev 1986, respectively. 
14 Note, however, that the very high level of volatility in the equity markets at the beginning of the sample (see 
Figures 2 and 3) is due to the fact that in those early years the international equity market was very thin.   7
separately. Such an empirical regularity is similar to what we also observe in price data (where 
stock market volatility is higher than interest rate and bond price volatility). 
 
3 The Role of the Financial Center 
 
There is an extensive literature on the role of financial centers, and in particular U.S. 
financial markets, in the transmission of international shocks. For instance, Ehrmann, Fratzcher, 
and Rigobon (2005) analyze the comovement among stock returns, interest rates, and the 
exchange rate in the United States and the European Monetary Union and find that U.S. financial 
markets are one of the main driver forces of the euro-area financial markets, explaining, on 
average 25 percent of the variance in financial prices.  Also, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 
(1993 have shown the importance of developed countries macroeconomic performance (growth 
and interest rates) on the fluctuations of capital inflows to emerging markets. More recently, 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003) have argued that the financial markets in developed countries act 
as a transmission mechanism of financial turmoil among emerging economies. 
To have a preliminary reading on the role of the financial center on the volatility of 
financial markets around the world, we estimate the correlations between the volatility of 
issuance by the periphery (both mature and emerging economies) and the volatility of issuance 
by the financial center (the United States). As shown in Table 4, the correlation between the 
volatility of issuance of all the regional groups and countries in the periphery and that of the 
United States is mostly positive and quite high. Interestingly, issuance volatility is much more 
highly correlated in the bond market than in the equity and syndicated-loan market (the average 
correlation is 0.41 in the bond market and 0.19 and 0.15 in the loan and equity markets, 
respectively). Two countries stand out in the table. The first is the United Kingdom, whose 
pattern of volatility is very close to that of the United States (the correlation in the bond market 
almost reaches 0.70); the other is Japan, with basically no comovement of volatility with that of 
the United States.
15  
Since volatility of issuance in the bond, equity, and syndicated-loan markets in most 
countries or regions is positively correlated with that of the United States, in the remainder of 
                                                 
15 Although not shown in the Table, the volatilities of Japanese issuance in all markets are basically uncorrelated 
with volatilities around the world.  Even in the bond market, the average correlation of each country’s or region’s 
volatility with that of Japan is -0.08.   8
this section we try to shed light on which economic links exist between U.S. issuance volatility 
and that of the other regions in the world. 
There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of financial 
market volatility. A large number of studies have devoted their attention to U.S. monetary policy 
and have shown that it plays a key role in explaining fluctuations in asset prices, both in the 
United States and in the rest of the world.
16  Following this strand of literature, we examine the 
effect of U.S. monetary policy on the ability of emerging and developed countries to gain access 
to international financial markets. 
Monetary policy in the United States can be transmitted directly to the rest of the world 
or indirectly by affecting prices of assets in the United States. To capture this indirect linkage 
and also to examine the possible spillovers of turbulence in financial markets in the United States 
to markets around the world, we include the volatility of U.S. equity prices in our analysis.  
The relationship between inflation and financial prices has also been the focus of 
attention of both theoretical and empirical research over the past 20 years. Most of this research 
relates the uncertainty generated by higher inflation to increases in financial risk and therefore to 
lower asset prices. For this reason, we also investigate the spillover effects of U.S. inflation on 
financial markets around the world.  
Finally, the literature on financial crises has pointed out that turmoil in financial markets 
(or at least in emerging economies) often happens during episodes of slowdown in world 
economic activity.  For example, the debt crisis in Latin America in 1982 occurred in the midst 
of a profound recession in the United States and other industrial economies.  In contrast, the 
empirical research on mutual fund markets suggests that volatility in financial markets may 
increase in good times. For example, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) examine whether 
U.S. mutual funds follow momentum strategies –buying past winners and selling past losers. 
They find that mutual funds do in fact buy past winners but do not sell past losers, suggesting 
that good news may generate higher volatility in financial markets. Therefore, we also examine 
the connection between episodes of higher economic growth and volatility of international 
issuance. 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Ehrmann, Fratzcher, and Rigobon (2005) for a study of the effect of U.S. monetary policy on 
asset prices in the European Union and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) for an analysis of the effect of U.S. 
monetary policy on equity prices around the world.    9
Table 5 looks in more detail at the relationship between U.S. economic and financial 
variables and volatility of issuance in international markets. Volatility of the U.S. monetary 
policy is captured with the volatility of the three-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate, U.S. stock 
market volatility is the volatility of the Dow Jones Industrial Index, U.S. inflation is the annual 
U.S. CPI inflation rate, and the fluctuations in economic activity in the United States are 
captured by the annual U.S. GNP growth rate. As shown in the first column of Table 5, 
volatilities of issuance in all markets are positively correlated (and with relatively high 
correlation coefficients) with interest rate volatility. Although with smaller coefficients, volatility 
of issuance is overall also positively correlated with U.S. stock market volatility, U.S. inflation, 
and U.S. growth. 
In order to understand better the transmission of volatility shocks from the center to the 
periphery, we estimate a Vector Autoregression model separately for emerging and mature 
economies.
17  We estimate three VARs separately for each market (bond, equity, and syndicated-
loan issuance volatilities). Each estimated VAR has five variables: volatility of issuance, interest-
rate volatility, volatility of U.S. stock market returns, U.S. CPI inflation rate, and U.S. GNP 
growth rate. Each VAR model includes two lags of all the variables. The R
2 for each of the 
VARs that we estimate, reported on Table 6, are all above 0.80. 
Figures 4 to 6 show the impulse responses
18 of issuance volatility in the bond, equity, and 
syndicated-loan market to a one-percentage point shock in the U.S. growth rate, U.S. inflation, 
U.S. interest rate volatility, and U.S. stock market volatility. Tables 7 to 9 show the 
corresponding variance decomposition. 
As shown in Figures 4 to 6, overall volatility of issuance in the three markets increases 
with higher volatility of interest rates and of stock prices, as well as with a higher U.S. inflation 
rate.
19 Overall, volatility of issuance also increases in good times (times of high growth in U.S. 
output). Nevertheless, not all shocks in U.S. indicators have statistically significant effects on 
                                                 
17 In the present model, mature-economy issuance volatility includes that of the United States. In order to isolate the 
effect of U.S. variables on other mature economies, we also re-estimated the same model having volatility of U.S. 
issuance and volatility of the mature-periphery issuance as two different variables. The results are similar and are 
available upon request. 
18 We use the Cholesky decomposition to identify the shocks. The ordering of the variables is: Output growth, 
inflation, stock market volatility, interest rate volatility, and volatility of issuance. We checked for different 
orderings and the results do not change significantly. 
19 Note, however, that the response of loan issuance volatility to increases in the U.S. inflation rate is hump-shaped.   10
issuance volatility. For example, shocks to U.S. inflation do not have statistically significant 
effects on turmoil in bond issuance of emerging economies.  
Shocks to U.S. interest-rate volatility are the ones that affect volatilities of gross issuance 
more strongly.  Moreover, they  have far stronger effects on emerging than on mature 
economies.
20  This evidence supports those findings in the international financial literature that 
suggest that fluctuations in U.S. monetary policy have triggered dramatic boom-bust patterns in 
international capital flows to Asia and Latin America.
21 
Figures 4 to 6 also show that turbulences in issuance of mature economies are also 
affected by U.S. stock market volatility and fluctuations in U.S. economic activity. This is also 
the case, but to a lesser extent, for emerging economies. For mature economies, the results 
indicate that higher volatility in equity prices fuels turbulence in both bond and equity market 
issuance. Finally, the results of these figures suggest that volatility of mature-economy issuance 
tends to be procyclical, increasing in times of higher U.S. output growth; this could be due to 
positive momentum in investors’ strategies, as suggested in Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1995). 
Tables 7 to 9 complement the results in Figures 4 to 6, by showing the variance 
decomposition of volatility of issuance in bond, equity, and syndicated loans for mature and 
emerging economies. These tables highlight the importance of the volatility of U.S. interest rates, 
which explains on average 10 percent of the variance across instruments in both mature and 
emerging economies. In contrast, the volatility of the U.S. stock market explains a high 
proportion of variance in mature, but not in emerging economies (10 percent versus 2 percent
22).   
A similar picture emerges for U.S. GNP growth (9 and 4 percent of variance explained in mature 
and emerging economies). U.S. inflation, instead, explains a relatively small proportion of 
variance both in mature economies and in emerging ones (4 percent and 2 percent). 
Overall, as shown in the last columns of Tables 7 to 9, shocks to U.S. real and financial 
fundamentals explain a significantly higher proportion of the variance of issuance of mature 
economies than of that of emerging economies (34 percent versus 18 percent, on average). This 
evidence suggests that domestic shocks and not external disturbances are more important in 
                                                 
20 The exception is the syndicated-loan market. 
21 See, for example, Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003) 
22 These numbers are the averages across markets (for all horizons) of the numbers reported in Figures 6 to 8.   11
explaining the changes  in the ability of emerging economies to gain access to international 
capital markets. This evidence agrees with the results in Kaminsky (2006), which classifies 
crises in a variety of emerging and mature economies.  In that paper, it is shown that crises in 
emerging markets tend to be of a different variety than those in mature markets.  In particular, it 
is found that all crises in emerging economies occur in the midst of multiple domestic 
vulnerabilities: A fragile banking sector, bubbles in stock and real estate markets, liability-
dollarization, and debt problems.  Naturally, a devaluation in these circumstances triggers a 
collapse of the economy.  In contrast, domestic vulnerabilities are much less pronounced in 
mature economies. For this reason, a currency crisis in mature economies tends to promote 




In this paper, we have analyzed the time-varying pattern of volatility of gross issuance in 
the international bond, equity, and syndicated-loan markets between 1980 and 2005. These are 
our main findings: 
 
1.  There is a boom-bust pattern in the volatility of issuance over the short run both in 
emerging and mature economies. Outbursts of volatility of emerging-economy 
issuance in international markets are mostly linked to currency crises. 
2.  In the long run, volatility of issuance has significantly declined in all the markets and 
regions that we study. Such a decline, however, has been more pronounced for mature 
economies. 
3.  There is evidence that the time-varying volatility of issuance around the world can in 
part be explained by real and financial developments in the financial center. In 
particular, the lower volatility of U.S. monetary policy and interest rates has 
significantly contributed to stabilize the pattern of issuance in financial markets 
throughout the world. 
4.  Shocks in the financial center explain a large share of volatility of mature-economy 
issuance in international markets. In contrast, most of the volatility of the emerging-
periphery issuance in international markets is explained by domestic factors. This   12
result agrees with the findings of the literature on financial crises, which indicate that 
financial turmoil in emerging economies is mainly triggered by domestic and 
financial vulnerabilities and not by external shocks.  
 
From a policy point of view, the implications of our findings appear to be significant. In 
particular, our results indicate that more stable monetary policies in mature economies have 
contributed not only to more stable economies in industrial countries
23 but also to less erratic 
international financial markets.  
Nevertheless, our results for emerging economies suggest that in order for these 
economies to gain continuous access to international capital markets, they should address 
domestic vulnerabilities.  Therefore, international institutions have correctly stressed that 
emerging economies should follow conservative macroeconomic policies and reform institutions.  
It has also been pointed out that emerging economies tend to follow procyclical macroeconomic 
policies,
24 fueling increases in the volatility of economic activity and triggering lending booms 
that often end up in financial crashes.  To avoid instability of the domestic economy, emerging 




                                                 
23 See, for instance, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) and Romer and Romer (2002).  See also the remarks by Vice 
Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. to the Banco de Mexico International Conference, Mexico City, Mexico. 
24 In contrast, mature economies tend to follow countercyclical polices, which tend to stabilize the business cycle.  
See, for example, Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004). 
25 There is some evidence that some emerging economies have been able to “graduate” from the procyclical group 
and conduct neutral or even countercyclical fiscal policies (see Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003)). In the 
particular case of Chile, the adoption of fiscal rules specifically designed to encourage public saving in good times 
may have helped in this endeavor.   13
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 Asia America and  Economies Mature
Africa  Economies
China Argentina Algeria Belarus Austria
Hong Kong Bahamas Bahrain Bulgaria Australia
Indonesia Bolivia Congo Czech Republic Belgium
India Brazil Egypt Czechoslovakia Canada
Macau Barbados Ghana Croatia Cyprus
Malaysia Belize Israel Estonia Denmark
Papua New Guinea Cayman Islands Ivory Coast Hungary Ireland
Singapore Chile Jordan Kazakhstan Finland
South Korea Colombia Kuwait Latvia France
Sri Lanka Costa Rica Lebanon Lithuania Greece
Thailand Dominican Republic Liberia Moldova Iceland
Taiwan Ecuador Morocco Poland Italy
El Salvador Mauritius Russian Federation Liechtenstein
Grenada Oman Slovenia Luxembourg
Guatemala Pakistan Slovak Republic Malta
Honduras Qatar Ukraine Netherlands
Jamaica South Africa USSR Norway
Mexico Turkey New Zealand
Panama Tunisia Portugal
Peru United Arab Emirates Spain




Countries in Each RegionPeriods World Mature Emerging United States Germany Japan United Kingdom Other Mature Asia Latin America Middle East  Transition
Economies Economies Economies and Africa Economies
1980s 16 12 25 33 63 23 38 17 48 -- 81 59
1990s 10 10 24 12 19 22 16 9 32 29 61 43
2000s 8 8 1 91 01 23 11 21 32 22 33 24 3
Average 12 10 23 19 33 24 23 13 36 27 61 47
Periods World Mature Emerging United States Germany Japan United Kingdom Other Mature Asia Latin America Middle East  Transition
Economies Economies Economies and Africa Economies
1980s 58 61 129 81 105 -- 140 64 104 108 141 --
1990s 23 22 49 29 113 75 41 32 42 95 65 94
2000s 23 21 40 84 54 50 56 22 44 122 64 74
Average 33 33 70 56 95 62 73 38 54 105 87 87
Periods World Mature Emerging United States Germany Japan United Kingdom Other Mature Asia Latin America Middle East  Transition
Economies Economies Economies and Africa Economies
1980s 15 20 14 51 87 106 37 16 14 39 20 61
1990s 9 11 13 16 63 77 23 15 14 25 34 46
2000s 7 8 10 8 38 50 22 15 21 22 25 24
Average 11 13 13 27 66 81 28 15 15 29 27 46






Volatity of International Issuance
a
(in Percent)Table 3 
Likelihood Ratio Test for the Presence of Time-Varying Volatility in Issuance 
       





   Bonds  58.2 90.0 0.00 
United States                   Equities  -38.6 -16.9 0.00 
   Syndicated Loans  21.4 57.4 0.00 
   Bonds  -10.0 57.4 0.00 
Germany                            Equities  -72.3 36.5 0.00 
   Syndicated Loans  -42.5 13.7 0.00 
   Bonds  46.3 46.8 0.64 
Japan                                Equities  -14.4 -6.5  0.00 
   Syndicated Loans  -70.6 -53.1 0.00 
   Bonds  47.8 72.9 0.00 
United Kingdom               Equities  -51.4 -29.7 0.00 
   Syndicated Loans  36.5 49.0 0.00 
   Bonds  111.9 125.0  0.00 
Other Mature Economies    Equities  10.6 15.6 0.01 
   Syndicated Loans  96.2 100.5  0.01 
   Bonds  18.0 24.9 0.00 
Asia                           Equities  -22.4 8.9  0.00 
   Syndicated Loans  84.3 89.8 0.00 
   Bonds  -10.1 4.6  0.00 
Latin America      Equities  -66.1 -59.6 0.00 
   Syndicated Loans  29.5 32.6 0.04 
   Bonds  -41.2 -41.1 0.95 
Middle East and Africa  Equities  -57.0 -47.7 0.00 
   Syndicated Loans 
46.2 54.2 0.00 
   Bonds  -8.8 -3.7  0.01 
Transition Economies      Equities  -46.0 -39.6 0.00 
   Syndicated Loans  -17.1 -12.1 0.01 
   Bonds  118.6 133.6  0.00 
Total                                Equities  20.6 36.6 0.00 
   Syndicated Loans  119.6 122.8  0.04 
 Table 4 
Correlation of Volatility of Issuance by all Regions and Countries with Volatility of Issuance by the United States 
                  
Markets  Germany  Japan  United  Other  Asia  Latin  Middle East   Transition  Average 
         Kingdom  Mature     America  and  Economies    
            Economies        Africa       
Bonds  0.74 0.16  0.66  0.53  0.66  0.08 0.20 0.24  0.41 
Equities  0.06         -0.29  0.43  0.13  0.12  0.43  0.37         -0.06  0.15 
Syndicated Loans  0.16  0.17  0.52  0.12        -0.10  0.56         -0.04  0.17  0.19 
 Table 5 
Correlation of Issuance Volatility with Selected U.S. Indicators 
       
Mature Economies 
       
   Volatility in       
Market  U.S. Interest      U.S. Stock  U.S. Growth  U.S. Inflation 
   Rates  Market Prices       
Bonds  0.67  0.28          -0.20  0.26 
Equities  0.39 0.05 0.22  0.24 
Syndicated Loans  0.31          -0.16  0.24  0.21 
        
Emerging Economies 
        
   Volatility in        
Market  U.S. Interest      U.S. Stock  U.S. Growth  U.S. Inflation 
   Rates  Market Prices       
Bonds  0.29  0.05  0.12           -0.06 
Equities  0.41 0.17 0.04  0.03 
Syndicated Loans  0.13          -0.10  0.08  0.20 






Syndicated Loans 0.86 0.87
Table 6
The R
2 in the VAR estimation1 0 1 2 12 15
2 0 2 1 17 21
3 1 4 2 19 26
4 1 4 5 19 29
5 1 5 7 18 32
6 1 5 9 18 33
7 2 5 9 18 34
8 2 6 9 18 35
9 2 6 10 18 35
10 2 6 10 18 36
11 2 6 10 18 36
12 2 6 11 18 36
Average 1 5 7 17 31
1 00405
2 0 0 11 1 12
3 0 1 14 1 16
4 0 1 16 1 18
5 0 1 16 2 19
6 0 1 16 2 20
7 0 1 16 2 20
8 0 1 16 3 20
9 0 1 16 3 21
10 0 1 16 3 21
11 0 1 16 3 21
12 0 1 16 3 21
























3 3182 1 5
4 6 1 15 7 29
5 8 2 17 11 39
6 1 0 3 1 71 44 4
7 1 2 3 1 71 74 8
8 1 3 3 1 61 95 0
9 1 3 3 1 62 05 2
10 1 4 3 1 52 15 3
11 1 4 3 1 52 25 4
12 1 4 3 1 52 35 4
Average 9 2 13 13 37
1 00426
2 10338
3 3043 1 0
4 5073 1 4
5 6 1 10 3 19
6 7 1 12 3 23
7 8 2 14 3 26
8 10 2 14 3 29
9 11 3 15 2 31
10 12 3 15 2 32
11 12 3 15 3 33
12 13 3 15 3 33
Average 7 2 10 3 22
Total U.S. 






















Volatility1 7240 1 3
2 9231 1 4
3 13 2 3 1 19
4 17 3 5 1 26
5 20 4 7 1 32
6 22 5 10 1 37
7 23 6 11 1 40
8 23 6 13 1 42
9 23 6 14 1 43
10 23 6 14 1 43
11 22 6 15 1 44
12 22 6 15 1 44




4 5411 1 1
5 6421 1 3
6 6421 1 4
7 7432 1 5
8 7432 1 6
9 7442 1 7
10 7442 1 8
11 7453 1 8
























QuarteraVolatility in each market is measured as the (annualized) standard deviation of the quarterly growth
rate of international issuance. The standard deviation is computed over a four-quarter moving window.

























1981:4 1986:4 1991:4 1996:4 2001:4a Volatility in each market is measured as the (annualized) standard deviation of the quarterly growth rate of international issuance. The standard deviation is computed over a four-quarter
moving window.
Figure 2













































































































































































































1981:4 1986:4 1991:4 1996:4 2001:4a Dotted lines represent 90-percent confidence intervals.
b Impulse responses are measured as the response of volatility to a one-percentage point increase in the variable being shocked (e.g., if U.S. growth increases by 
one-percentage point, mature economies' issuance volatility increases by half-percentage point on impact).
Emerging Economies
Figure 4
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Response to a One-Percentage Point Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Volatilitya Dotted lines represent 90-percent confidence intervals.
b Impulse responses are measured as the response of volatility to a one-percentage point increase in the variable being shocked (e.g., if U.S. growth increases by 
one percentage point, mature economies' issuance volatility increases by five percentage points after a year).
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Response to a One Percentage Point Shock to U.S. Interest Rate VolatilityaDotted lines represent 90-percent confidence intervals.
b Impulse responses are measured as the response of volatility to a one-percentage point increase in the variable being shocked (e.g., if U.S. growth increases by 
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Response to a One-Percentage Point Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Volatility